In Great Britain wide circles have for some time reflected on the advantages of import restrictions as a means of increasing employment. The following article examines the validity of some major arguments brought forward in support of import curbs.
T
he danger was soon perceived: The sharp rise of oil prices in late 1973 and early 1974 was bound to cause huge current account deficits in the western industrial countries, and so it had to be feared that some of them, finding themse!ves in a tenuous external economic position, would resort to restrictions on foreign trade. The danger was soon banished however, or so at least it seemed. Since import restrictions were likely to provoke requital and, given the defective absorptive capacity of the OPEC countries, the inevitable trade deficits would show up largely in the industrial countries, the OECD countries arranged between themselves that they would refrain from protectionist intervention.
But if anybody on the strength of this agreement and the substantial reduction if not elimination of the current account deficits in all western industrial countries during 1975 believed that the danger of a relapse into protectionism had disappeared, he has been deceiving himself. For the improvement in the external position of the western industrial countries is primarily a consequence of the world-wide recession: The fall in production has caused the deficit countries' import volume to contract more sharply than their export volume while the terms of trade improved at the same time. Soaring unemployment was the obverse of the fall in production. In most countries is has risen to its highest level for over twenty years.
As the external economic difficulties ,,transposed" themselves into an employment problem, curbs on imports were demanded with increasing insistence in various countries. While however in most countries a partial withdrawal from the attained degree of trade liberalisation is wanted only by a few groups with special interests and obvious motives, in Great Britain wide circles have for some considerable time reflected on the advantages of import restrictions as a means of increasing employment although it has long been taken for granted that a far-spread free trade is beneficial for the prosperity of all participating economies, * HWWA-Institut f(Jr Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg.
at least as far as western states in a broadly similar state of economic development are concerned.
These reflections cannot be brushed aside without putting forward special arguments, especially in the discussion in Great Britain, because the advocates of import curbs in the ranks of the British trade unions and political groups can refer to an expert opinion in their support: About a year ago the economists forming the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG) came out in favour of import controls when they presented a forecast of economic developments in Great Britain in 1975-1978. They reached their conclusion as a result of a comparison of three projections envisaging alternative economic strategies.
There was an acute reason for undertaking these medium-term projections: The CEPG study was concerned with the parameters set to economic policy in practice by the big balance of trade deficits resulting in particular from the sharp rise of oil prices in late 1973 and early 1974. With Great Britain's heavy international indebtedness in mind the authors arrived at the incontestably correct conclusion that the current account deficits must be substantially reduced over the medium term if the external value of sterling is not to deteriorate considerably. The prospect that Great Britain will from 1980 be a net exporter of oil gives the country a certain measure of credit-worthiness, and for this reason it would not be essential to eliminate the short-term deficits. It was thought that gradually diminishing shortfalls on current accountcutting the deficit by 1978 at least to something like two-thirds of the 1974 deficiency -could be financed "in the market", i.e. with funds derived chiefly from the OPEC countries. But this reduction to about s 2.6 bn (at 1974 prices) would still entail great risks and, possibly, sooner or later necessitate a sharp adjustment.
The balance of trade, which shows a particularly large deficit, was regarded as the vantage-point for a lasting improvement, and successive sterling devaluations would be the method appropriate to a market economy system. They would have to be at least drastic enough to prevent a deterioration in costs relative to the international level and have to go hand in hand with a rather restrictive economic policy: The real growth of the gross domestic product would have to be kept down to 2.5 p.c. on average in 1976-1978, after zero growth in 1975. The model computations led the CEPG to the conclusion that under the assumed conditions the number of unemployed would rise well beyond the 1,000,000 mark by 1978, which woutd be equivalent to an unemployment rate of about 5 p.c. The rate would even rise to 6.5 p.c. if the current account were to be brought into full balance by this strategy.
The unwelcome negative effect on employment could be avoided by a more drastic devaluation. To reduce the unemployment rate to 2.5 p.c., this devaluation would have to bring the relative costs compared with other countries down by 15 p.c., and to reach this lower cost ratio, which would have to be maintained until 1978, the external value of sterling would have to be lowered by about 30 p.c. The repercussions on internal price and wage levels of such a movement of the exchange rate would require an even larger reduction of the sterling rate of exchange in 1976 in order to make sure of the "new" cost ratios. With this variant the economists expected the consumer prices to rise by a good 30 p.c. in 1975 and 1976. In the next two years they would again go up sharply, and in 1978 they would still rise by about 18 p.c.
The CEPG Proposal
The Cambridge economists considered the low employment level of the first variant and the high inflation rate of the second alternative both unacceptable. The same is obviously true of any of the combinations in between these two extreme Solutions which would involve a lower level of employment than in the first variant and less severe inflation than in the second model. Last but not least, it must be borne in mind that foreign creditors still keep large accounts in Great Britain. If the risks of devaluation seem too great, they might withdraw their monies, which would greatly aggravate the external problems and hence the internal difficulties as well. The authors are therefore definitely in favour of the third variant: The desired improvement on curront account could be achieved coincidentally with a gradual reduction of the unemployment rate to 2.5 p.c. by halving the average annual rate of increase of imports of industrial manufactures in the projection period (to 9 p.c. from the 18 p.c. annually recorded in [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] , either through imposition of quotas or by surcharges.
Prices are expected to rise more slowly under this third projection than on the assumptions of the second variant, but there is much uncertainty on this score. The wages' behaviour will be crucial. If the wage-earners are content with small increases in real incomes, the updrift of consumer prices could slow from 16 p.c. last year to 4 p.c. in 1978. It could not be ruled out however that it would abate only slightly, from 20 p.c. in 1975 to 15 p.c. in 1978. The authors of the study are of course well aware of the fundamental objections to the strategy they favour but dismiss the frequent claims that import restrictions involve dangers for the internal and external economy:
[] The "beggar-my-neighbour" argument is rejected on the ground that the alternative of a deflationary domestic production and demand trend as the result of a restrictive economic policy would ultimately have the same negative effects on empIoyment abroad since the demand for imports would necessarily have to be reduced quite substantially;
[] The danger of retaliatory measures on the part of directly affected industrial countries is regarded as fairly slight because they would be the ones to lose most in an escalating trade war;
[] As for the view that the efficiency of British industry would be impaired by abatement of competition, exactly the opposite would be the case: The greater security of British industry would improve its productivity, especially because the propensity to invest would not, as was otherwise to be feared, evaporate.
These countercharges are however hardly adequate to dispose of the objections against import controls. The plea for the strategic variant of "safeguarding a high level of employment while lessening the external imbalance through import controls" merely shows that British economic policy is asked to take great risks. The fact that Great Britain in 1964-1966 unilaterally levied special duties on industrial manufactures, first at 15 p.c. and later, on international pressure, at "only" 10 p.c., without requital by its trading partners is hardly such as to strengthen the CEPG argument. The analogy applies to the measure itself but ignores entirely the fundamental differences in the economic situation in the world between the mid-sixties and the present time. Today -as distinct from the mid-sixties -the western industrial countries have undergone a severe recession. Production and employment levels are almost everywhere lower than they were three years ago. This is one of the reasons why, as already mentioned, the protectionist tendencies
